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SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS/OP-OSA AND DIFRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
IO FOR IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#) [UNGA](#)
SUBJECT: (U) RUSSIAN-PROPOSED UNGA RESOLUTION ON BILATERAL
REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS AND THE NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR STRATEGIC RELATIONS

REF: GENEVA 0617 (SFO-GVA-III-002)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START
Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-008.

SUMMARY

[1](#)2. (S) During negotiations to develop a treaty to replace the START Treaty, the Russian Delegation presented a paper for consideration by the United States containing a draft United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms and the New Framework for Strategic Relations. The Russians explained that the draft UN resolution was based on the paper they had provided in the previous session in July (REFTEL).

[1](#)3. (S) The Russian Delegation outlined a proposal based on UNGA Resolution 59/94 dated December 17, 2004, entitled "Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions and the New Strategic Framework," which had been jointly proposed by Russia and the United States. The Russian Delegation noted that the 2004 resolution had been very useful, and a similar resolution prior to the 2010 Review Conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would likewise be useful. The Russian Delegation stated that the United States and Russia should demonstrate a UN leadership role by offering a draft Joint Resolution, with the idea of developing a consensus document and adopting the resolution

without a vote, before the September 24, 2009 UN Security Council Summit. The draft UNGA resolution was taken for study.

RUSSIA PROPOSES UPDATE TO
2004 UNGA RESOLUTION 59/94

14. (S) During the July 22-24, 2009 START Follow-on negotiation session (REFTEL), the Russian Delegation proposed that Russia and the United States present a joint update to 2004 UNGA Resolution 59/94 entitled "Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms and the New Framework for Strategic Relations." Antonov again asked that the U.S. Delegation consider the Russian proposal for a bilateral resolution for presentation to the UN General Assembly regarding U.S.-Russian bilateral strategic offensive arms reductions and the new framework for bilateral relations. He said Russia believed an updated resolution would be useful ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference to highlight the expiration of the START Treaty, to recognize the implementation of the START obligations of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and to express satisfaction with the implementation of the Moscow Treaty. Additionally, Antonov said that additional updates to the proposed resolution could recognize:

-- the beginning of the negotiations between Russia and the United States to work out a new treaty on strategic offensive arms;

-- each Party's obligations under Article VI of the NPT;

-- the need for early entry into force of the CTBT;

-- support for the FMCT negotiations; and

-- a call to other states to join in the nuclear disarmament efforts of Russia and the United States, and to do their utmost to support the development of the disarmament process.

15. (S) Antonov said he would like the United States to study the Russian proposal, as well as to present its views on this issue. He said there should not be crucial differences on the issues and that it was important to complete the work soon. He believed that Russia's best hope is to have the resolution adopted without objection. He said it was his view that this resolution could be resolved first by Russia and the United States, and then offer other P-5 countries to join consensus. He also said that the Sides should consider including Pakistan, India and Israel, as well as the heads of the non-aligned movement to join this resolution.

16. (S) Antonov handed over the document and stated that it had not been shared with any other country. Since the summit of the UN Security Council was scheduled for September 24, time was short for us to consider the document.

17. (S) The text of the official translation of the Russian proposal follows.

Begin text:

Official Translation

To be Turned over to
the U.S. Side

Paper of the Russian Side
September 2, 2009

Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions
and the new strategic framework

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 59/94 of 3 December 2004,
and other relevant resolutions,

Noting with satisfaction the establishment of the
new strategic relationship between the Russian Federation
and the United States of America, based on the principles
of equal security, trust, openness, cooperation, and
predictability,

Welcoming the determination of the two countries to
work together, and with other nations and international
organizations, to meet their respective obligations under
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (the NPT), which was opened for signature
on 1 July 1968, FOOTNOTE 1

Mindful of the obligation of all parties to the NPT
to abide by all of their commitments under the Treaty,

Recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(START), FOOTNOTE 2 which is expiring, and the Treaty on
Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), and
of their provisions, which will lay the foundation for
ensuring confidence, openness and predictability in the
further reduction of strategic offensive arms;

Welcoming the fulfillment by the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian
Federation, the United States of America, and Ukraine of
the obligations assumed under the START Treaty,

Noting with satisfaction the commencement of
negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United
States of America to work out a new, comprehensive, legally
binding agreement on further reductions and limitations of
strategic offensive arms, and the constructive nature of
those negotiations,

Noting the increasing cooperation between the
Russian Federation and the United States of America in
addressing significant challenges to international
security, as illustrated, in particular, by their joint
efforts regarding Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)
of 28 April 2004,

11. Welcomes the decision of the Russian Federation
and the United States of America on concluding at an early
date a new legally binding agreement to replace the current
START Treaty;

12. Recognizes that the new treaty on the further
reduction of strategic offensive arms will help in
establishing more favorable conditions for actively
promoting security and cooperation and enhancing
international stability;

13. Also recognizes the significance of the
contribution that the Russian Federation and the United
States of America have made to nuclear disarmament within
the framework of fulfilling their obligations under Article
VI of the NPT;

14. Further recognizes that since the end of the
cold war, the Russian Federation has reduced the number of
its START-accountable deployed strategic warheads from
approximately 9,000 to less than 4,000, and has also
eliminated approximately 1,450 launchers of
intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, 47 ballistic missile submarines, and

more than 60 heavy bombers;

¶15. Recognizes that in the same time period, the United States of America has reduced the number of its START-accountable deployed strategic warheads from over 10,000 to less than 6,000, and has also eliminated more than 830 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 24 ballistic missile submarines and approximately 350 heavy bombers;

¶16. Expresses the hope that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, FOOTNOTE 3 will enter into force as soon as possible;

¶17. Notes with approval that the Russian Federation and the United States of America have halted the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and express support for international negotiations, within the framework of the approved programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, for a verifiable treaty to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and that they are committed to dispose of existing stockpiles of weapon-grade materials that are surplus to defense needs consistent with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT;

¶18. Deeply appreciates, in this context, the implementation of the 1993 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, under which approximately 370 tons of Russian highly enriched uranium have been down-blended for use as power reactor fuel, and the fact that, under the Agreement, the total amount of highly enriched uranium processed will reach 500 tons;

¶19. Welcomes the commitment of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to executing, subject to reliable funding, the 2000 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation;

¶10. Invites the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of their nuclear reduction activities;

¶11. Notes the rising expectations of the global community for progress in nuclear disarmament, expresses support for current and future efforts in this area, and calls upon all States Members of the UN and, above all, those possessing nuclear arsenals, to join in the efforts in this area already being undertaken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America and to actively contribute to the disarmament process;

¶12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session the item entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework."

Begin footnotes:

1 United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485

2 The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 16, 1991 (United Nations Publication, Sales No. R.92.IX.1 ((Russian-language edition))), appendix II.

3 See A/50/1027.

End footnotes.

Begin Translator's Note:

In this translation we have attempted to reflect UN usage, style and terminology.

End Translator's Note.

End text.

U.S. SAYS WAIT UNTIL
START FOLLOW-ON SIGNED

¶8. (S) Gottemoeller said she appreciated Russia's proposal and would study it. Since the last meeting, Washington had discussed the proposal and how the document could be choreographed. Gottemoeller offered that it would make sense to deploy this resolution at the conclusion of the START Follow-on negotiations. Antonov said that he was not against such an idea, but it was his view that, since the new treaty would be a symbol of great strength, it should have its own central resolution with implementation at the 2010 General Assembly. He said some of the key elements contained in the Russian-proposed draft would be lost, or minimized, if a resolution were to be issued based on the completion of the START Follow-on Treaty. Thus, he believed that it would be in the best interest of the United States to consider taking advantage of the transition of power to the Obama Administration, with its strong support for non-proliferation and disarmament issues, to make such a hard-hitting statement at this year's General Assembly. He said he was not imposing this idea on the United States, but offering it as an invitation to consider the approach.

¶9. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov and said she now had a better understanding of the purpose of Russia's proposal. She asked if there was a relationship to issuing this resolution with the upcoming Summit Meetings of the UN Security Council on September 24 and the Nuclear Security Summit in March 2010. Antonov responded that it was his personal assessment that the crucial event was the NPT Review Conference in May. He would not like to see the NPT collapse and thus create more Nuclear Weapon States. He said that the negative events from the Bush Administration's policies towards Russia had a negative influence on the NPT process as a whole. In order to strengthen the NPT, he believed it would be best if both Russia and the United States could highlight all of the activities associated with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in advance of the May 10 NPT Review Conference. Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for his remarks and said the United States would provide its reaction to the proposed joint draft resolution at the next session on September 21.

RUSSIAN CD REPRESENTATIVE
SHARES CONCERNS

¶10. (S) Victor Vasiliev, Deputy Russian Representative to the CD, told U.S. Charge Larson on September 2 that he had some real concerns about the wisdom of attempting to get a bilateral resolution through the CD before the START Follow-on Treaty was completed. He cited concerns about publicly prejudging the outcome of the negotiations and the possibility that the resolution would engender an extraneous debate, which the United States and Russia might have difficulty controlling. Vasiliev said he mentioned his doubts to Russian negotiator Antonov who, "shrugged and said it was the Minister's idea." (Begin comment: Charge assumed Antonov was referring to Foreign Minister Lavrov. End comment.)

¶11. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
CLINTON